Judicial Independence in Pakistan: Myth, Model, or Moving Target?

Abstract

Abstract

The concept of judicial independence in Pakistan is often used as a constitutional ideal but it is contested as being dealing as an operational fact. The research draws parallels between de jure protection and de facto autonomy in critical episodes of constitutional warfare, rivalry over appointments, and high-salience adjudication, using a mixed-methods design that combines doctrinal analysis, qualitative content analysis, and episode-based mapping (2005-2025). The results indicate that although Pakistan's constitutional system provides substantial formal protection, the different realms of independence vary over time and across subject matters. The main factors that contribute to volatility are politicized appointments and leadership choices; internal judicial politics (particularly bench composition and case assignment); and legitimacy pressures increased by judicial activism and compliance challenges. The article claims that deepening independence should be achieved through stabilizing operational rules and incentives rather than the reiteration of constitutional ideals.